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28 D EF EN S EH ER E A A D 2 0 2 4 E D I T I O N
466 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2024

Increase Cabo Verde Burkina USD0.33bn
Niger
USD0.01bn
Faso
USD0.83bn
Central African Rep
USD0.06bn Ethiopia
Ghana
USD0.34bn USD1.54bn
Benin
USD0.13bn
Burundi Dem Republic
USD0.06bn of Congo
South Sudan USD0.76bn Mali
USD0.05bn USD1.09bn
Chad
USD0.35bn
Rwanda
USD0.19bn Botswana
USD0.55bn
Tanzania
Côte d'Ivoire
Togo Congo USD0.69bn USD1.15bn
USD0.20bn USD0.29bn
Gabon
USD0.27bn
Mozambique
USD0.20bn Zambia
Senegal
Guinea Kenya USD0.45bn South Africa USD0.41bn
Madagascar USD0.50bn USD1.28bn USD2.86bn
USD0.11bn
Cameroon Uganda
Namibia USD0.46bn USD1.01bn Nigeria
USD0.35bn USD1.99bn
Guinea-Bissau
USD0.03bn
Angola
Mauritius USD1.25bn
The Gambia Sierra Leone USD0.24bn Lesotho
USD0.01bn USD0.02bn USD0.03bn Liberia
Decrease Djibouti Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Seychelles Somalia Sudan USD0.02bn USD0.06bn USD0.10bn
Zimbabwe
Malawi
n.k
n.k
n.k
n.k
n.k
n.k
[1] Map illustrating 2023 planned defence-spending levels (in USDbn at market
Real % Change (2022–23) exchange rates), as well as the annual real percentage change in planned
More than 20% increase Between 0% and 3% decrease defence spending between 2022 and 2023 (at constant 2015 prices and exchange
Between 10% and 20% increase Between 3% and 10% decrease rates). Percentage changes in defence spending can vary considerably from
year to year, as states revise the level of funding allocated to defence. Changes
Between 3% and 10% increase Between 10% and 20% decrease indicated here highlight the short-term trend in planned defence spending
Between 0% and 3% increase More than 20% decrease between 2022 and 2023. Actual spending changes prior to 2022, and projected
spending levels post-2023, are not re ected.
Spending 2% of GDP or above Insuf cient data
©IISS
ɺ Map 11 Sub-Saharan Africa: regional defence spending(USDbn, %ch yoy) 1

International Engagement and Procurement Š•œ˜ȱ•’–’Žȱ‹žŽœȱŠ—ȱ‘Žȱ™›ŽŸŠ’•’—ȱžœŽȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱ
›ŽŒ˜›Š‹•ŽȱŒŠ™’Š•ȱ‹žŽœȱ˜—•¢ȱ›ŽŒŽ’ŸŽȱ ŬǯŬ‹—ȱ
ŠŒ›˜œœȱŬŪŬŭǰȱ˜ —ȱ›˜–ȱ Ŭǯً—ȱ’—ȱŬŪŬŬǯȱ ‘˜ž‘ȱ
–’•’Š›¢ȱ˜ȱ‹˜˜œȱŽ–™•˜¢–Ž—ȱ•ŽŸŽ•œǯȱ
Despite these challenges, South Africa remains active in international defense collaborations and procurement. For in-
ŽœŽ›—ȱ ›’ŒŠȱ ›Ž–Š’—œȱ ž‹Ȭ Š‘Š›Š—ȱ ›’ŒŠȂœȱ
‘Žȱ ’Ž›ȱ ›Ž—ȱ ‘Šœȱ ‹ŽŽ—ȱ ˜›ȱ –˜Žœȱ ›˜ ‘ȱ ˜ŸŽ›ȱ
stance, the country has continued to engage in UN peacekeeping missions, deploying forces to the DRC, Mozambique,
’–Žǰȱ‘Žȱ•˜ ȱŽ¡™Ž—’ž›Žȱ•ŽŸŽ•œȱ›Ž™›ŽœŽ—ȱŒ‘›˜—’Œȱ
œž‹›Ž’˜—ȱ ’‘ȱ‘Žȱ‘’‘ŽœȱŠ‹œ˜•žŽȱŽ¡™Ž—’ž›Žǯȱ œȱ
and South Sudan. South Africa’s defense industry also maintains a presence in international markets, with exports of
ž—Ž›’—ŸŽœ–Ž—ȱ’—ȱ—Š’˜—Š•ȱŠ›–Žȱ˜›ŒŽœǯȱ —ȱ™Š›ǰȱ
œ‘Š›Žȱ ˜ȱ œ™Ž—’—ȱ ›Ž™›ŽœŽ—Žȱ Š‹˜žȱ ŭŰǯŲƖȱ ˜ȱ ‘Žȱ
advanced systems such as the Rooivalk attack helicopter and the Ratel and RG-31 armored vehicles.
‘’œȱ›ŽĚŽŒœȱ›Ž•Š’ŸŽȱ•ŽŸŽ•œȱ˜ȱ—Š’˜—Š•ȱœŠ‹’•’¢ǰȱ‹žȱ ›Ž’˜—Š•ȱ ŽŽ—ŒŽȱ ‹žŽœȱ ’—ȱ ŬŪŬŭǰȱ ž™ȱ ›˜–ȱ ŭŬǯŬƖȱ
South Africa’s procurement plans for 2024 reflect a focus on improving air and sea capabilities, with ZAR1 billion allo-
cated for airlift transport and ZAR700 million for helicopters and vehicles. However, the overall cost of modernizing
the navy’s submarines and frigates is estimated at ZAR4.2 billion, which is almost three times the amount budgeted for
2023–26.
In summary, while South Africa’s defense industry remains a regional leader, its capabilities are under threat due to
economic constraints, reduced defense budgets, and management challenges within key state-owned enterprises. Re-
covery efforts, including the restructuring of Denel and modernizing military capabilities, are ongoing but will require
sustained investment and careful management to restore the country’s military strength.
SOURCE: THE MİLİTARY BALANCE 2024